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4 How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis
F. Scott Kieff and Henry E. Smith
Awell-functioning patent system fosters innovation, createsjobs, and helps generate capital investment and overalleconomic growth. But a patent system can also be plagued
by unnecessary and expensive court and administrative procedures
and extreme uncertainty. Most patent reform proposals these days
are designed to give officials and courts more power to weaken or
eliminate ‘‘unworthy’’ patents, with so-called patent trolls as the
beˆtes noires du jour. No patent system is perfect, and our present
system could be meaningfully improved. But in light of the rapid,
and we would argue excessive, changes that have already occurred
in the courts, what patent law needs is a tweaking of existing safety
valves and processes—not opening the floodgates to more discre-
tion and uncertainty.
Although a great deal of daylight may lie between the Bush and
Obama administrations on a range of issues, when it comes to
patent reform the bills brought before Congress during both
administrations are remarkably similar, with the new bills intro-
duced in early 2009, like those from 2007 and 2008, proposing sig-
nificant changes to the patent statutes that have been in place since
the 1952 Act.
During the past few years intense debates have brewed between
those emphasizing the benefits of strong patents and those seeking
55
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to decrease baseless litigation and administrative process. Both
groups raise important concerns and both have lobbied Congress
and the White House in a curious set of political alignments. Those
in the pro-patent camp are unions joining forces with Republicans
and small businesses siding with big Pharma. Among the patent
skeptics are the big players in High Tech joining with Democrats.
Similarly, both the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal
have advocated a major overhaul of patents (Timiraos 2007; Edito-
rial 2007; Lee 2007; Sewell 2007; Fitzgerald 2007). The crowded
reform bandwagon has a great deal of momentum.
The emerging consensus for flexibility targets three problems in
current patent law. First is the concern with junk patents and the
flood of patent applications at the Patent Office. Overworked and
necessarily unaware of all the prior art that has preceded the patent
applicants, examiners have let through a number of weak patents—
leading to tales of patents for peanut butter sandwiches. Second,
and relatedly, some industries are said to be subject to ‘‘anticom-
mons’’ in which multiple rights overlap on the same subject (think
gene fragments) also sometimes seen as ‘‘patent thickets’’ in which
multiple patent rights need to be assembled to bring a product to
market. We believe these two problems are overblown and can eas-
ily be handled within the framework of the 1952 Act, especially as
supplemented by current case law. Third is the problem of ‘‘patent
trolls,’’ creatures who are notoriously hard to define or to spot in
the wild. For some, a troll is any nonpracticing entity, a business
that does not manufacture products covered by the patent. Such a
definition threatens the specialization function of patents: Why
should an inventor or even a company not be able to concentrate
on research and development and leave manufacturing to others
without running the risk of a being hit with a compulsory license?
We recognize that a conceptually narrower problem does occur
with patentees who induce reliance and then try to capture ex post
the investments by the now-infringer. Sometimes these trolls are
also called submarines, in that they surface and threaten to torpedo
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unsuspecting commercial traffic. But as we discuss in a moment,
existing equitable safety valves are more than adequate to this task.
T R I
Proposed reformers tend to fall into two groups. First are those
who would alter the process to tighten the standard for granting
patents, typically by giving some official or judge the discretion to
decide what was within the skill of those in the prior art without
being tethered (as heretofore) to factual inquiries into laboratory
notebooks, printed publications, sample products, and the like.
Such discretion-based proposals go by various names, including
enhanced examination, opposition, reexamination, and second-
window review. Second among reformers are those who would alter
patent remedies, with injunctions being disfavored and more-
tailored damages as the ‘‘solution.’’
Interestingly, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have already
altered patent law greatly along the lines favored by the pro-flexi-
bility reformers. The Supreme Court decision in the 2007 KSR case
injected more discretion into the determination of obviousness,
thereby making it easier to deny patents. The Court also has
rejected, in the 2006 eBay case, the long-prevailing rule that a pat-
entee with a patent adjudicated to be both valid and infringed
should be able almost automatically to get an injunction; it now
seems to require such a patentee to demonstrate its entitlement
to an injunction on the more discretionary standard for obtaining
injunctions from other areas of law. The Court has also, in the 2008
Quanta case, made it more difficult for patentees to license firms
without at the same time licensing their customers.
All this amounts to a sea change in patent law, and all without a
single revision to the patent statute. Although we certainly have
bones to pick with some of these and other similar decisions, they
do raise the question, Why don’t we give them a chance to work
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(this was after all what advocates in those cases and of patent
reform generally have told us those decisions were designed to do)
before tinkering with the statute itself and its valuable, innovation-
promoting architecture?
The best place to start considering the role—and drawbacks—of
greater flexibility is in the central question of patent law: Does an
invention satisfy the nonobviousness requirement for obtaining a
patent? That is, in light of possibly far-flung and disparate pieces of
prior art, is the invention something that a person having ordinary
skill in the art would have already been just about to do—or not?
The 1952 Act makes prior art largely a question of fact, based on
evidence such as documents and factual testimony, as compared
with opinion testimony. Some see the recent KSR decision as stand-
ing for the proposition that government decision makers such as
judges now have increased discretion to pronounce what the prior
art teaches and would like to extend such discretion to patent
examiners. Others think the case was narrowly decided on its facts
and that the relevant inquiry remains an objective determination of
precisely what was taught by the particular combination of relevant
pieces of prior art (Epstein and Kieff 2007; Haber, Kieff, and Par-
edes 2007).
Importantly, proposed statutory changes would implement the
same flexible approach urged by one side of the KSR debate. We
think that flexibility can be carried too far and that the flexibility
approach on offer relies on two false premises about how the sys-
tem actually works.
The first false premise is that beefing up the patent examiner’s
resources would help her find the key prior art. Of course, our
examining corps should have good access to Internet databases and
ample time and training to peruse them. But no realistically avail-
able amount of time and training will help an examiner at his desk
obtain the laboratory notebook of an individual researcher at some
company or university or an obscure student thesis on the book-
shelf of a foreign library, which is where the key prior art is often
found.
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The second false premise is that discretionary decision making,
whether in court or the Patent Office, can be immune from political
and other pressure. Asking a decision maker to use her legal or
technical expertise as the primary basis for deciding what she thinks
the state of the art was at a particular time in history gives her
greater discretion than asking an ordinary jury whether a particular
document or sample product existed at a particular time and what
that document actually contains. By increasing the discretion of
government bureaucrats, flexibility increases uncertainty and gives
a built-in advantage to large companies with hefty lobbying and
litigation budgets.
L  H
The historical consensus about patents turns out to be the exact
opposite of today’s. Concepts such as across-the-board flexibility,
balance, discretion, and subjectivity are not new to our patent sys-
tem; we’ve tried them before, in ways strikingly similar to those
proposed today. They were the hallmarks of the patent systems of
the 1940s and of the 1970s, and, although the product of well-
intentioned efforts, the results in each setting were consistent and
bad.
Like other proposals to deal with our current crises, dialing down
the patent system gained steam in the New Deal. Created in 1938,
President Roosevelt’s Temporary National Economic Commission
specifically targeted patents under the misguided belief that they led
to the ‘‘concentration of economic power’’ (Public Resolution). By
a decade later, the entire patent system had become practically deci-
mated by the courts.
Determinations about a patent’s validity in those days typically
boiled down to a flexible but tautological standard: to be patent-
able, an invention had to constitute what a judge considered to be
an ‘‘invention.’’ Some courts, including the Supreme Court in its
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1950 A&P case, treated this as a ‘‘synergism’’ test under which
patents would be valid only when the claimed invention combined
existing elements to achieve a mystically synergistic effect. The test
became so vague and difficult to satisfy that Justice Jackson
remarked in the 1949 Jurgensen case that ‘‘the only patent that is
valid is one which this court has not been able to get its hands on.’’
At the same time, a patentee’s options for licensing or bringing
infringement suits were severely curtailed throughout the 1930s and
1940s as courts virtually eliminated the patent law doctrines that
hold a defendant accountable for causing infringement by third
parties. By the late 1940s, the Supreme Court was seeing patent
misuse and antitrust concerns everywhere.
In response, Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act, which aimed
to reverse the Supreme Court’s expansive approach to patent mis-
use and set forth an objective test for patentability called ‘‘nonob-
viousness.’’ Avoiding the usual process of extensive interest-group
lobbying, leading to ‘‘balance’’ in the sense of brute compromise,
the 1952 Act represented the consensus views of legal technicians
interested in developing a system that was balanced in the different
sense of logical coherence. In 1948 the New York Patent Law Asso-
ciation asked its past president, Giles Rich, to draft a bill that would
provide a more predictable framework for patent law. Rich collabo-
rated with a Patent Office representative named Pat Federico to
draft a bill, coordinate national discussion of the issues, and explain
them to Congress. The result was the 1952 Act, which substantially
remains the patent law today.
The 1952 Act was applauded for its predictability by the leading
jurists and commentators of the time, such as Learned Hand and
Jerome Frank of the New York-based U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. Judge Hand had repeatedly called for courts to
determine patent validity objectively. As he explained in the 1946
Safety Car Heating & Lighting case when criticizing the absurdity of
the synergism test: ‘‘substantially all inventions are the combination
of old elements; what counts is the selection, out of all their possible
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permutations, of that new combination which will be serviceable.’’
Writing later, Giles Rich went further, explaining that a synergism
test makes no sense because ‘‘[t]he laws of physics and chemistry
in accordance with which all inventions perform do not permit of
the judicially imagined magic according to which 2!2"5’’ (Rich
1972). Judge Frank put the net impact of the more objective
approach very simply in the 1942 Picard case when he explained
how patents produced by such a system can be the vital slingshots
smaller innovative ‘‘Davids’’ use to compete against large estab-
lished ‘‘Goliaths.’’
Although the progress made by the 1952 Patent Act had been
seriously eroded by the end of the 1970s, leaders from both sides of
the political aisle soon acted to reinvigorate patents. A key figure
from the patent system of the 1970s, Pauline Newman, then head
of chemical giant FMC Corporation’s patent operation and now a
judge on the Federal Circuit, has been reminding policy makers and
commentators for years that the push to re-strengthen the patent
system that culminated in the 1982 act signed by President Reagan
was the direct result of a serious effort launched by President Carter
(Newman 2005). The 1982 act created the court on which judge
Newman now sits: the Federal Circuit, which hears the appeals
from most patent cases across the country. By 1978, when the econ-
omy had reached serious disarray, President Carter, through his
Commerce Department, empanelled a group of experts to conduct
a ‘‘Domestic Policy Review’’ to study domestic innovation. Its key
findings focused on the destructive impact on commercializing
innovation and economic growth caused by unpredictability in the
patent system; its chief recommendations included strengthening
the patent system through the increased predictability that could be
implemented by a new court (Industry Subcommittee 1979).
We have now come full circle—again. After a consensus era of
strong patent protection, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions,
especially the current reform proposals, are back to the future. Why
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not learn from the twentieth-century history of patents, instead of
repeating it?
I  P S
Much of the impulse for root and branch change comes from an
incomplete view of what the patent system does and how it does it.
Proponents of flexibility measure the system’s success by how well
it achieves the ‘‘correct’’ reward for inventions. The ideal bench-
mark would be an all-knowing planner who would hand out checks
in the exact minimum amount to induce the invention in ques-
tion—and in any event no greater than the invention’s social value.
What all this overlooks is that the system does more than provide
a reward for invention; it also provides an overall architecture for
innovation.
Getting an invention made and bringing it to market require
coordination among its many complementary users, including
developers, managers, laborers, other technologists, financiers,
manufacturers, marketers, and distributors. Patents help achieve
this socially constructive coordination by allowing those various
actors to interconnect with each other like modules of a larger sys-
tem. The underlying mechanism depends in at least three funda-
mental ways on the expectation that patents will be enforced with
strong property protection. First, the credible threat of exclusion
associated with a published patent acts like a beacon in the dark,
drawing to itself all those interested in the patented subject matter.
The beacon effect motivates those diverse actors to interact with
one another and with the patentee, starting conversations among
the relevant parties. Second, the widespread expectation that the
patent will be enforced motivates each of these parties to reach
agreements with one another over the use and deployment of the
technology. That bargaining effect falls apart if the parties are
unsure that the patent will be enforced; if the patent is seen as not
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being enforced, there is significantly less need to reach agreement
ex ante. Thus the fear of weak enforcement creates a disincentive
for the necessary parties to work together at the outset. Finally,
patent protection allows patentees to appropriate the returns to
(rival) inputs to developing and commercializing innovation—
labor, lab space, and so forth—without the law having to trace the
relative contributions of these multifarious inputs. Instead patents
form a platform on which coordination and development can take
place (Kieff, 2007; Smith 2007).
But when it comes to evaluating the system, today’s proponents
of flexibility tend to treat it as a bundle of features or levers that
can be tweaked on an industry-by-industry or even a case-by-case
basis. How high should the bar for patentability be? What should
the size of the reward be for a contribution? Would an injunction
lead to too much bargaining power? The list goes on and on.
As we have seen, those designing and implementing our present
patent system realized that many of the benefits of patents could be
achieved holistically. The benefits in terms of stability and coordi-
nation from the system are not results achieved by this or that part
of the system, which could be better tailored by greater levels of
official discretion, in the interest of wringing out all the errors from
the system.
The current consensus for flexibility problematically—and ironi-
cally—deals in absolutes. If the system does not provide good
notice all the time, it is ‘‘not doing its job’’ and thus any change is
presumptively an improvement. Theoretical problems with multi-
ple patents impeding commercialization were declared an impend-
ing disaster before any empirical investigation. Modest problems
along these lines exist, but their very modesty suggests that altering
the mix of certainty and flexibility is better than declaring the sys-
tem a failure and opening the flood gates of discretion (Murray &
Stern 2007; Walsh et al. 2004).
This is not to say that the system cannot be evaluated empirically
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or that it cannot be improved. But it does suggest caution and cre-
ativity in evaluating the case against the system and for radical
reform. Although we think the flexibility-based solutions offered by
patent critics are imprudent, some of the underlying concerns they
raise are important to address. Here are our proposals.
Remove the presumption of patent validity. The patents that drive
most calls for reform are indeed pernicious because they allow pat-
entees to threaten expensive but meritless litigation against compet-
itors, although the extent to which the U.S. patent system is
afflicted with a disproportionate number of ‘‘bad’’ patents is a topic
of serious debate (Katznelson 2007). Under the present system, an
issued patent is presumed valid, which requires a challenger to
prove invalidity by a higher standard of proof (‘‘clear and convinc-
ing evidence’’) than usually prevails in civil cases (‘‘preponderance
of the evidence’’).
The costs under the present system of knocking out even an
obvious patent can be large. The infamous litigation over Amazon’s
‘‘one-click-shopping-patent’’ probably required Barnes and Noble
to spend more than two million dollars in litigation costs alone to
defeat the preliminary injunction that had wreaked havoc during
the 1999 Christmas season rush. The threat of such expensive litiga-
tion over even a questionable patent is precisely what is said to
terrorize potential defendants, large and small, about the present
patent system. But this in terrorem problem can be greatly mitigated
through more targeted measures than injecting large dollops of dis-
cretion.
Dialing down the present presumption of validity to something
like the ordinary standard for civil cases would decrease the bad,
in terrorem, effect. When litigation is needed, the carefully crafted
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedures for join-
der, compulsory counterclaims, and against relitigating issues
and claims decided in previous litigation, which are collectively
designed to avoid abusive and repetitive process. The Federal
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Rules also provide streamlined procedures such as summary judg-
ment, which avoids long trials where there is no genuine issue of
material fact.
In the end, a decrease in the presumption of validity would be
particularly good for the ‘‘Davids,’’ because it directly protects them
from the in terrorem effect of junk patents and the threat of expen-
sive but baseless litigation to defend against patents whose ‘‘valid-
ity’’ rests entirely on the present presumption. It also indirectly
helps them raise the funds needed to litigate against a baseless
opponent, regardless of whether they are asserting patent infringe-
ment or invalidity.
Some may argue that increasing the reliance on opinions of
counsel will make it harder for lawyers to give advice, which is
where the old tension underlying attorney-client privilege comes
into play. On the one hand, decision makers often need to verify
whether a party acted with good advice of counsel. On the other
hand, it will be hard for a lawyer and client to openly discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of various approaches if they know that
all their communications are likely to be subject to open review
later in court. But this is a false dichotomy. One lesson our society
has learned from corporate scandals such as Enron is that it can be
important to decouple auditing from advising. An opinion of coun-
sel about a patent can be an important auditing tool that should be
kept separate from the important advising resources a client needs
in the competitive market and in litigation. This distinction should
motivate the Federal Circuit as it works to clarify the evolving case
law relating to attorney-client privilege for patent opinions of coun-
sel after the 2004 Knorr case. Also, to prevent opinions of counsel
from becoming a box to check and a whitewash for misconduct,
courts have shown little hesitance to sniff out bogus opinions of
counsel or to specifically call out their authoring attorneys and law
firms, as was done by both the trial and the appellate courts in their
respective 1997 and 1998 decisions in Johns Hopkins v. CellPro.
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Institute symmetric fee shifting. Imagine a patent system in which
both patentees and potential infringers had good access to fee shift-
ing when the other side’s case was baseless. Under today’s rules, the
patentee wants to educate the alleged infringer about the strength
of the infringement case early in the process because this increases
the patentee’s chance of getting enhanced damages, such as attor-
ney fees. For the same reason, the alleged infringer has a strong
incentive to avoid notice by avoiding communication.
Symmetric fee shifting would allow alleged infringers to collect
attorney fees from a patentee who brings an infringement case after
having been warned, for example, about a particular item of inval-
idating prior art. This practice of fee shifting when a patentee makes
baseless arguments in defense of the patent’s validity would match
the present rules in Sections 284 and 285 of the statute that allow
patentees to get fees and (potentially) treble damages from
infringers who should have known about their own infringement
and have thus mounted baseless arguments in their defense. Such
symmetry in fee shifting would encourage parties to exchange
information and resolve disputes before undertaking expensive liti-
gation (Kieff 2003; 2009). Under our rule, the alleged infringer
would similarly want to educate the patentee about any validity-
destroying prior art. Symmetry in fee shifting helps align both par-
ties’ incentives to communicate with each other.
Such a system would mean that the existing markets for audit-
type opinions of counsel would grow. Under today’s rules, the
alleged infringer often wants to get an opinion of counsel early in
the process so as to bolster later arguments that it had a good-faith
basis for believing it had not infringed valid patent rights, thereby
decreasing the chances of paying enhanced damages or attorney
fees if it loses the case. Using our rule, the patentee would also want
to get an opinion of counsel early in the process to establish its
good-faith basis for its position, so as to avoid having to pay the
alleged infringer’s attorney fees.
Under our proposed practice, it will be easier for third parties to
HOW NOT TO INVENT A PATENT CRISIS 67
essentially spread the costs across multiple customers by opening
businesses that provide rating services like those seen in today’s
capital markets that evaluate a particular company’s stock or bond
offerings. The ability to get attorney fees in baseless cases also opens
up the market for contingent and other flexible fee arrangements
for those who are too liquidity constrained to fight on their own.
Equity in remedies. Injunctions have come under a lot of fire, and
recent flexibility-based reform proposals have centered on substi-
tuting tailored damages for injunctions in patent cases. Most of the
time injunctions provide the certainty needed to avoid disputes
and, when disputes do arise, encourage the parties to resolve them
early. With injunctions, infringers have a hard time gaming the sys-
tem or using the possibility of undercompensatory damages to do
an end run around negotiations. Infringement is the violation of a
property right; an injunction forces the infringer to stop and
enforces the delegation of valuation questions to patentees and
their contractual partners, with a view toward markets for inputs
and products, rather than officials, courts, and experts for hire
(Kieff 2001; Smith 2009).
But as illustrated by the furor over trolls, injunctions have their
limits. When an infringer in good faith makes large, irreversible
investments that include reliance on a patent that would have been
easy to design around ex ante but hard to do so ex post, the
infringer does have a claim on our sympathies (Denicolo` et al.
2008). But contrary to what critics sometimes claim, this problem
does not distinguish patent law from tangible property, which faces
the same problem. In building encroachments, the good-faith
encroacher—for example one building close to the lot line in reli-
ance on a faulty survey—can argue against an injunction and pay
only damages. But this emphatically does not apply to bad-faith
encroachers: those who know they are committing a wrong. Many
in the patent reform camp claim that patent law is not like property
because it fails to give notice of claims: patent law cannot capture
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inventions in language, and patents are too hard to find (Bessen
and Meurer 2008). We think the reforms we have discussed would,
by providing individualized notice, help ensure that others infringe
(if at all) in bad faith. Another possible rule is that for those cases
of infringement that are based on the doctrine of equivalents, which
extends the literal claims to cover a penumbra of hard-to-foresee
additional invention space, in the remedy should be presumed
(strongly) to include only damages, not an injunction (Smith
2007).
But introducing more discretion into determinations of patent
validity is exactly the wrong way to go. For the inevitable uncer-
tainty and difficulty in giving notice that remain (in real property
law too, more than patent skeptics acknowledge), traditional equi-
table principles are more than up to the job.
The 2006 Supreme Court eBay decision held that the standard
for an injunction is based on a four-factor test applied in other
settings, without much further guidance. Taking their cue from the
concurrences in the case, some see this as an invitation to inject
more discretion to withhold injunctions in the broadly defined
public interest. Others see the case as largely confirming a strong
tendency toward injunctions, once validity and infringement have
been decided in court.
We think that the best way to implement eBay is to take this
equitable approach seriously and apply it in the traditional (and
sensible) fashion. Crucially, the equitable approach is a safety valve
for those situations in which someone who is otherwise a good
candidate for getting an injunction—such as a patentee whose
patent has been infringed—should not get one because of some
glaring injustice. The equitable approach is flexible but not bound-
lessly so, in contrast to currently proposed reforms that elevate dis-
cretion to new heights. Moreover this safety valve is probably all we
would need.
First, the order of the factors in the test—irreparable harm, inad-
equacy of damages, balance of hardships, and public interest—is no
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accident. In the old days when courts of equity were separate from
courts of law, the inadequacy of the legal remedy (here damages)
because of irreparable harm was jurisdictional. There is a functional
reason for this as well: equity is a safety valve, not an ocean of free-
floating discretion. It is designed to be effective only within a lim-
ited domain where it’s most needed and will not upset general
expectations.
Turning to the balance of hardships and public interest, these
two factors sound a lot broader than the safety valves they are
meant to be. The balancing called for in the traditional equitable
test is not a full-blown cost-benefit analysis or an even a weighing
of hardship of both sides. Instead, traditional equitable analysis
asked whether someone otherwise entitled to an injunction should
not get one, in the judge’s discretion, in light of a grossly dispropor-
tionate hardship on the defendant (Epstein 1997; Schwartz 1964;
American Jurisprudence 2d Injunctions 2005). The point here is
not to get the exact correct reward but to avoid egregious errors in
an otherwise robust system of injunctive relief.
Likewise, the public interest standard in equity is not an invita-
tion to maximize official discretion. Rather, it is another safety valve
to prevent major harm to third parties. Judges are simply not able
to measure the public interest in some more specific fashion, such
as a cost-benefit analysis or the judges’ values or who knows what.
Finally, the equitable approach embraces more than this four-
factor test. Injunctions can be tailored to the harm and delayed to
give an innocent infringer time to redesign (Lemley and Shapiro
2007). And a delay in suing or lurking in wait while good-faith
reliance occurs can sometimes be grounds for denying injunctions.
C
The approach we propose will decrease slightly the average value of
all patents because patentees will now have to fight harder on the
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issue of validity when they assert their patents in court. But this is
not necessarily bad. The costs of arguing to the Patent Office to get
patent rights in the first instance will be less than in a system under
which the examiners have largely unfettered discretion to reject
applications.
Most important, the approach we propose directly addresses the
fears of those held hostage under the current system by the threat
of litigation costs surrounding patents that are merely presumed to
be valid. Under a decreased presumption of validity, such a terror-
izing effect largely evaporates. With fee shifting, meritless suits
against infringers will be discouraged, and the full traditional but
limited use of equitable discretion will provide all the safety valves
we need for good-faith infringers and those facing true patent trolls.
These approaches should be given time to work. The prudent
course for the country is to embrace a strong patent system based
on predictability and facts, which will benefit all players, large and
small, in their contributions to American innovation and economic
growth.
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